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intuition [addendum]
In the history of philosophy “intuition” has been used
primarily as a term for an intellectual, or rational, episode
intimately tied to a priori knowledge. The term has some-
times been used in a broader way to include certain sen-
sory episodes (appearances) and certain introspective
episodes (e.g., inner awareness of the passage of time). In
contemporary philosophy this broader use has fallen out
of fashion (except among Kantians), and the narrower
use prevails.
An intuition in this sense is simply a certain kind of
seeming: For one to have an intuition that P is just for it
to seem to one that P. This kind of seeming is intellectual,
not sensory or introspective, in the following sense: Typ-
ically, if it is possible for someone to have the intuition
that P, then it is possible for someone to have the intu-
ition that P in the absence of any particular sensory or
introspective experiences relevant to the truth or falsity of
the proposition that P. For this reason, intuitions are
counted as “data of reason” not “data of experience.” In
this connection, intuitions are sometimes called “a priori
intuitions” or “rational intuitions.”
Intuition must be distinguished from belief: Belief is
not a seeming; intuition is. For example, I have an intu-
ition—it still seems to me—that the naive set-abstraction
axiom from set theory is true despite the fact that I do not
believe that it is true (because I know of the set-
theoretical paradoxes). There is a rather similar phenom-
enon in sense perception. In the Müller-Lyer illusion, it
still seems to me that one of the two arrows is longer than
the other, despite the fact that I do not believe that one of
the two arrows is longer (because I have measured them).
In each case, the seeming persists in spite of the counter-
vailing belief. Similar considerations show that intuitions
must likewise be distinguished from guesses, hunches,
and common sense.
Many philosophers identify intuitions with linguistic
intuitions. But this is mistaken if by “linguistic intuition”
they mean intuitions about words, for most of our intu-
itions simply do not have any linguistic content. Other
philosophers think of intuitions as conceptual intuitions.
Nothing is wrong with this if “conceptual intuition” is
understood broadly enough. But there is a common con-
strual—originating in David Hume’s notion of relations
of ideas and popular with logical positivists—according to
which conceptual intuitions are all analytic. The problem
is that countless intuitions are not analytic on the tradi-
tional construal of that term (convertibility into a logical
truth by substitution of synonyms). For example, the intu-
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ition that, if region r1 is part of region r2 and r2 is part of
region r3, then r1 is part of r3. Possibility intuitions are also
not analytic (e.g., in epistemology the intuition that the
Gettier situations are possible). In response, some philoso-
phers have countered that possibility intuitions are just
intuitions of consistency, but this view is mistaken on sev-
eral counts. For example, it is consistent to hold that
region r1 is part of r2, r2 is part of r3, but that r1 is not part
of r3, despite the fact that such a thing is not possible.
Standard practice in logic, mathematics, linguistics,
and philosophy is to use intuitions as evidence. (For exam-
ple, in epistemology Roderick Chisholm uses intuitions to
show that traditional phenomenalism is mistaken, and
Edmund Gettier uses intuitions to show that the tradi-
tional identification of knowledge with justified true belief
is mistaken. In metaphysics Saul Kripke uses intuitions to
show that, if water is H2O, then it is necessary that water is
H2O. In philosophy of mind, Hilary Putnam uses intu-
itions to show that logical behaviorism is mistaken, and so
forth.) A great many philosophers believe that use of intu-
itions is essential to the indicated disciplines.
Radical empiricists, who doubt that intuitions have
evidential weight, usually defend their view by pointing
to the fact that intuitions can be unreliable. They cite, for
example, the fact that our intuitions about naive set the-
ory are in conflict with our intuitions about classical
logic. But this shows only that traditional infallibilism is
mistaken, not that intuitions lack evidential weight. After
all, sense perceptions have evidential weight even though
they can be unreliable. (Incidentally, although various
cognitive psychologists—Peter C. Wason, Philip Johnson-
Laird, Eleanor Rosch, Richard E. Nisbett, D. Kahneman,
A. Tversky, and others—have examined human rational-
ity with a critical eye, their studies have not attempted to
test empirically the reliability of intuitions, and it will be
quite difficult to do so.)
Why should intuitions have evidential weight? A
plausible answer is that intuitions have an appropriate tie
to the truth: As a noncontingent fact, if a subject’s cogni-
tive conditions (intelligence, attentiveness, and so forth)
were suitably close to ideal, the subject’s intuitions would
be sufficiently reliable to permit the subject to arrive at a
mostly true theory regarding the subject matter of those
intuitions. This is a consequence of an analysis of what it
is to possess concepts determinately: A necessary and suf-
ficient condition for determinately possessing one’s con-
cepts is that one’s intuitions have this kind of tie to the
truth; if the subject’s intuitions lacked this sort of tie to
the truth, that would only show that the subject did not
determinately possess those concepts (or that the sub-
ject’s cognitive conditions were not sufficiently good). In
contemporary philosophy, many have come to accept
(some form of) this moderate rationalist theory of intu-
itions and concept possession.
See also A Priori and A Posteriori; Belief; Chisholm, Rod-
erick; Empiricism; Hume, David; Kripke, Saul; Philos-
ophy of Mind; Putnam, Hilary; Truth.
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intuition
[addendum 2]
An intuition is a noninferential awareness of something:
a concept, a proposition, space or time, a physical object,
our own existence, or God. While sometimes people talk
of sensory intuitions of perceptual objects, by which they
mean an immediate awareness of how they appear, this
use of “intuition” is becoming more rare. Nowadays
philosophers use the term primarily to mean a nonsen-
sory and nonintrospective awareness of a proposition or
concept. Some philosophers hold that an intuition must
be of a proposition that seems necessarily, or possibly,
true. But people who lack the concepts of necessity and
possibility are able to have something very like what
philosophers call intuitions. So a more plausible view is
that a person has an intuition that P if and only if P seems
true, or possibly or necessarily true, where that appear-
ance is intellectual—that is, based on the understanding,
not on perception or introspection. George Bealer thinks
that intuitions are not beliefs because we can disbelieve
something that still appears true. Perhaps some argument
has convinced us that in a lottery with seventy-six million
tickets we know before the drawing that we hold a losing
ticket if the ticket is in fact a loser, but it may still seem
that at that time we do not know that it will lose.
Thus, by “intuition”most philosophers mean a rational
intuition—or a rational insight—that is based solely on
understanding the proposition that is its object. The intu-
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